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RECENT CASES
Creditors' RightsASSIGNMENT OF MONEY TO BE REFUNDED UPON
SURRENDER OF LICENSE HELD VOID AGAINST
CREDITOR DOCKETING JUDGMENT AFTER
SURRENDER OF LICENSE FOR CANCELLATION
Plaintiff bank loaned funds to a liquor dealer for use in renewing the
dealer's liquor store license.' As security, it obtained an assignment of any
refunds which might be made by the state to the dealer in the event that2
the application was rejected or the license surrendered for cancellation.
The dealer subsequently defaulted, and the bank filed its assignment with
the state comptroller.3 Two days later, the dealer surrendered the license
to the State Liquor Authority for cancellation, for which he was to receive
a pro rata refund from the state comptroller.4 Subsequently, the City of
New York docketed a tax warrant against the dealer, and in supplementary
proceedings served a third-party subpoena on the state comptroller which
created a creditor's lien in favor of the city.5 The Court of Appeals of
New York, affirming orders of the supreme court 6 and the appellate division 7 directing the state comptroller to pay the funds to the city, held that
the bank's assignment was subordinate to the city's tax lien. City of New
York v. Bedford Bar & Grill, 2 N.Y.2d 429, 141 N.E.2d 575 (1957).
The rights of an assignee against a judgment creditor of the assignor
who becomes such subsequent to the date of the contract of assignment
1. See N.Y. ALcoHOLIc BEVERAGE CONTROL LAw §§ 54(2), 63.
2. The assignment embraced "all monies due or which may become due [to the
assignor] from the State Liquor Authority or the Comptroller of the State of
New York . . . in the event that a license is not granted . . . or in the event
" Instant
of the surrender . . . cancellation or other release, of the license fee ...

case at 434, 141 N.E.2d at 577 (dissenting opinion).
3. Filing of the assignment put the comptroller on notice of the assignment.
If, after notice, money is paid to the assignor, the payment is no defense in a suit
by the assignee. St. Andrew v. Manchaug Mfg. Co., 134 Mass. 42 (1883); Goldfarb v. C. & K. Purchasing Corp., 170 Misc. 90, 9 N.Y.S.2d 952 (Sup. Ct. 1939);
2 WMLLISTON, CONTRAcrs §433 (rev. ed. 1936).
4. N.Y. ALCOHOLIC BEVRAGE CONTROL LAW § 127. After surrender of the
license, the State Liquor Authority must compute the amount due on the refund,
and execute and deliver a receipt to the licensee for this amount. If, within
thirty days of the date of surrender, the license has not been or is not about to be
cancelled for violation of the liquor law, the Authority will order the comptroller
to pay the amount due, less unpaid state liquor taxes, to the licensee upon presentation of the receipt

5. See N.Y. CIVIL PRAcTIcE AcT § 779.
6. City of New York v. Bedford Bar & Grill, Sup. Ct, Albany Co.,
July 12, 1954.
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depend in large measure upon whether the subject matter of the assignment is deemed to have been in being at the time the contract was made.
If the subject matter of the contract is a fund determined to have been
in being on the contract date, the assignee prevails at law on the theory
that both legal and equitable title to the fund have passed to the assignee by
virtue of the assignment,8 leaving no interest in the assignor for the judgment creditor to attach.9 In the instant jurisdiction both assignments of
money to be returned upon rejection of an application for a liquor license 10
and of a rebate right on the surrender of a liquor tax certificate11 have been
characterized as funds in being with the result that the legal right of the
assignee has been held superior to the interests of a subsequent judgment
creditor of the assignor.
On the other hand, where the fund is held to be merely potential at
the time of the assignment, at least three lines of reasoning, with consequent
variations in result, have been advanced by the courts. Under one view,
although the assignee has an enforceable right in equity against the assignor
from the date of the contract of assignment,'2 the assignment is ineffective
7. City of New York v. Bedford Bar & Grill, 285 App. Div. 1202, 140 N.Y.S.2d
762 (3d Dep't 1955).
8. As between the assignee and the debtor the rationale is usually put in terms
of subrogation. See 4 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 856 (1951); 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS
§ 446A (rev. ed. 1936). Where the subject matter is not yet in being, the assignment is not recognized at law, and the assignee cannot recover against the debtor
of the assignor on the debt which is the subject of the assignment. Cf. Bradley
Lumber Co. v. Burbridge, 213 Ark. 165, 173, 210 S.W.2d 284, 288 (1948) (dictum);
Hoffman v. Townsend, 198 Okla. 335, 336, 178 P.2d 89, 91 (1946) (dictum);
BISPHAM, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY § 142 (11th ed. 1931).
But where the subject
matter, although not yet in being, has a potential existence, the assignee has an
enforceable right in equity. See, e.g., Bradley Lumber Co. v. Burbridge, supra
at 173, 210 S.W.2d at 288; Kimball v. Farmers & Mechanics' Bank, 138 N.Y. 500, 34
N.E. 337 (1893); Behm v. Gee, 117 Utah 151, 161-62, 213 P.2d 657, 662-63 (1950);
BISPHAM, op. cit. mtpra, § 141; 1 PomEROY, EQUITY JURIsPRUDENcE § 168 (5th ed.
1941).
9. A judgment creditor cannot receive a greater interest in the property than
the debtor had at the time of attachment See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Pomona
Tile Mfg. Co., 82 Cal. App. 2d 592, 186 P2d 692 (1947); McCloskey v. Chase
Nat'l Bank, 285 App. Div. 148, 153, 136 N.Y.S2d 55, 59 (1st Dep't 1954), aff'd
mem. 308 N.Y. 998, 127 N.E.2d 847 (1955); Fry v. Stetson, 370 Pa. 132, 135, 87
A.2d 305, 307 (1952).
10. Capitol Distributors Corp. v. 2131 Eighth Ave. Inc., 285 App. Div. 541,
139 N.Y.S.2d 117 (3d Dep't 1955), aff'd -inem. 1 N.Y.2d 842, 135 N.E.2d 726
(1956) ; cf. O'Connell v. Worcester, 225 Mass. 159, 114 N.E. 201 (1916).
11. Niles v. Mathusa, 20 App. Div. 483, 47 N.Y. Supp. 38 (1897), aff'd, 162
N.Y. 546, 57 N.E. 184 (1900) where it was held that the assignment of a liquor
tax certificate-permissible under an earlier version of the present law, although
prohibited now by N.Y. AIcoHoLic BEVERAGE CONTROL LAw § 114(2)-(3)-raises
in the assignee a legal interest in the refund. Significantly, the court in the Niles
case, supra made little of the fact that the document itself was capable of assignment: "What Mathusa in effect assigned . . . was not so much the paper
given . . . by the State, but . . . the right to traffic in liquor, and a right to rebate
on the discontinuance of that traffic. . . ." Id. at 488, 47 N.Y. Supp. at 41.

12. Instant case at 432-33, 141 N.E.2d at 576 (dictum). The assignment may
be treated as a contract binding the assignor to give specific performance when
the subject of the assignment comes into being. 2 WIL.ISTON, CONTRACTS §413
(rev. ed. 1936). See also Stone, The "Equitable Mortgage" in New York, 20
COLum. L. REv. 519 (1920).
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against a judgment creditor of the assignor whose lien attaches before the
fund has come into actual existence.1h However, when the subject of the
assignment does come into existence, the assignment is considered "perfected," and the assignee has a right superior to that of any judgment
14
Another line of
creditor whose lien attaches subsequent to that date.
divests the
completely
of
assignment
contract
that
the
argument asserts
5
can
creditor
judgment
A
the
fund.'
in
interest
beneficial
assignor of any
6
Since the assignor no
attach only to the extent of the debtor's interest.'
longer has a beneficial interest in the property, the rights of subsequent
17
New York's Third
judgment creditors yield to those of the assignee.
Judicial Department, in dealing with the assignment of money to be refunded upon surrender for cancellation of a liquor license, has espoused
a third rule is borrowed from the law of the state governing mortgages
of chattels to be acquired in the future-that a mortgage of after-acquired
13. Matter of Gruner, 4 Misc. 2d 471, 74 N.Y.S.2d 38, 40 (Surr. Ct. 1947),
modifying 295 N.Y. 510, 68 N.E.2d 514 (1946); Stover v. Eycleshimer, 42 N.Y.
620 (1867) (dictum).
14. Cook v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 160 F.2d 490, 493 (4th Cir. 1947);
In re Stiger, 202 Fed. 791, 795-96 (D.N.J. 1913); Bradley Lumber Co. v. Burbridge, 213 Ark. 165, 173, 210 S.W.2d 284, 288 (1948); Kimball v. Farmers &
Mechanics' Bank, 138 N.Y. 500, 506, 34 N.E. 337, 339 (1893); 4 PoMERoy, op. cit.
siupra note 8, § 1283. New York courts have utilized the "perfection" doctrine in
numerous cases. See, e.g., Matter of Cornell, 170 Misc. 638, 12 N.Y.S.2d 162 (Surr.
Ct. 1939); Fairbanks v. Sargent, 117 N.Y. 320, 22 N.E. 1039 (1889); Stover v.
Eycleshimer, 42 N.Y. 620 (1867). Cf. In re City of New York, 197 Misc. 154,
95 N.Y.S.2d 26 (Sup. Ct. 1950). See also Matter of Gruner, 295 N.Y. 510, 68
N.E.2d 514 (1946), rearg. denied and remanded to take proof, 296 N.Y. 668, 69
N.E.2d 822 (1946), nwdified under new proof, 4 Misc. 2d 471, 74 N.Y.S.2d 38
(Surr. Ct 1947) (an assignment of proceeds to be realized from the sale of a
stock exchange seat is perfected when the fund becomes available).
15. ".

.

. it is fundamental that the mere making of an assignment, whether

written or verbal, operates from the time of its making pro tanto to divest the
interest of the assignor, irrespective of notice thereof to the principal debtor."
Matter of Kitching, 141 Misc. 704, 706, 253 N.Y. Supp. 112, 115 (Surr. Ct. 1931)
(legal and equitable assignees of distributory shares of residuary legatee prevail
over receiver in supplementary proceedings, when it does not appear that the receiver was appointed prior to the execution of the assignments).
16. See note 9 supra.
17. Since under this view the time of "perfection" is immaterial, the assignee
has been held to prevail over a judgment creditor who becomes such before the fund
comes into being. Williams v. Ingersoll, 89 N.Y. 508 (1882); City of New York
v. Clouse, 197 Misc. 154, 95 N.Y.S.2d 26 (Sup. Ct. 1950); cf. Seamon v. Federated
Films, 142 N.Y.S2d 324, 329 (N.Y. City Ct. 1955). By the same logic, the
assignee can enforce the assignment against a judgment creditor who becomes such
after the fund comes into being. R. C. Williams & Co. v. Ace Restaurant (not
officially reported) New York Law Journal, July 28, 1939, p. 2984; Montrose Industrial
Bank v. Brennan (not officially reported) New York Law Journal, Nov. 29, 1939,
p. 1865.
18. Frank v. Lutton, 267 App. Div. 703, 707, 48 N.Y.S.2d 137, 139 (3d Dep't
1944); Atlas Advertising Agency v. Casa Cubana, 259 App. Div. 951, 19 N.Y.S.2d
900 (3d Dep't 1940); Palmer v. Tremaine, 259 App. Div. 951, 20 N.Y.S.2d 145
(3d Dep't 1940); Alchar Realty Corp. v. Meredith Restaurant, 256 App. Div.
853, 8 N.Y.S.2d 733 (3d Dep't 1939) ; Mariano v. Cathay House Chinese Restaurant,
199 Misc. 410, 106 N.Y.S.2d 325 (Sup. Ct. 1951); O'Niell Co. v. Ward, 4 Misc. 2d
470, 32 N.Y.S.2d 559 (Sup. Ct 1941) ; Schaefer Brewing Co. v. Amsterdam Tavern,
171 Misc. 352, 12 N.Y.S.2d 701 (Sup. Ct 1939).
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19
chattels, even though recorded, is invalid as to creditors of the mortgagor.
The instant court, ruling for the first time on the question, adopted the
rule of the Third Department and held that the rights of the assignee were
subordinate to the claim of a judgment creditor who attaches at any time
20
after the date of the contract of assignment.
The instant decision subordinates the rights of one who has supplied
the source of the fund 21 relied upon as security and who has asserted his
interest prior to any attempt by the judgment creditor to attach a lien. Although the opinion is unclear, it apparently determines that equitable assignments are incapable of perfection against judgment creditors even when
attachment of a lien by the latter is not sought until after the potential fund
has come into existence.22 Earlier cases in the jurisdiction, in which judg-

ment creditors have prevailed over equitable assignees, may be explained
on the ground that the judgment creditor attached his lien before the subject
23
of the assignment came in esse, preventing perfection of the assignment.
However, the instant court apparently considered that surrender of the
liquor license for refund brought the property into being,24 thereby preclud19. The New York Lien Law provides in part that "every mortgage...
which is not accompanied by an immediate delivery, and followed by an actual and

continued change of possession of the thing mortgaged, is absolutely void as against
creditors of the mortgagor . . . unless the mortgage . . . is filed as directed in
this article." N.Y. LIEN LAW § 230. Although mortgages of goods to be acquired
in the future are not specifically covered by this section, it has been consistently construed to prohibit upholding mortgages of after-acquired chattels against creditors
of the mortgagor even if filed. Titusville Iron Co. v. New York, 207 N.Y. 203,
209, 100 N.E. 806, 808 (1912); Zartman v. First Nat'l Bank, 189 N.Y. 267, 272-73,
82 N.E. 127, 129 (1907); Rochester Distilling Co. v. Rasey, 142 N.Y. 570, 37 N.E.
See Stone, supra note 12.
632 (1894).
20. Instant case at 433, 141 N.E.2d at 575.
21. Brief for Assignee-Appellant, p. 2, instant case.
22. The ambiguity of the instant opinion arises from the court's use of what
appear to be inconsistent lines of authority. The doctrine of Titusville Iron Co.
v. New York, 207 N.Y. 203, 209, 100 N.E. 806, 808 (1912), and Zartman v. First
Natl Bank, 189 N.Y. 267, 272-73, 82 N.E. 127, 129 (1907), cited by the court
as "the undoubted general rule," instant case at 432, 141 N.E.2d at 576, is that
the assignment is imperfectable and void against judgment creditors who become
such at any time after the assignment. However, Matter of Gruner, 4 Misc. 2d
471, 74 N.Y.S.2d 38, 40 (Surr. Ct. 1947), modifying 295 N.Y. 510, 68 N.E.2d
514 (1946), also relied upon by the court, instant case at 433, 141 N.E.2d at 577,
holds that the assignment is unenforceable only against judgment creditors who
become such before the fund has come into being. Arguing from the Gruner
rule, supra the dissenting justices maintained that the fund came into being when
the license was surrendered, citing Strand v. Piser, 291 N.Y. 236, 240, 52 N.E.2d
111, 112-13 (1943). The assignment having thus been perfected prior to the docketing of the judgment by the creditor, the assignee, they argued, is entitled to
priority. Instant case at 438, 141 N.E.2d at 580. In that the majority found it
unnecessary to determine the point at which the fund came into being, it seems fair
to conclude that their opinion rests, not on any theory of "perfection" but upon
the proposition that the assignment was imperfectable as against the judgment
creditor. Indeed, the only relevant language in the majority opinion, a reference
to "Bedford's property in the Comptroller's hands resulting from Bedford's surrender of the license," seems to signify substantial agreement with the fact as
found by the dissent. Instant case at 432, 141 N.E.2d at 576. But if the court so
found, it could not have reached its result by an application of the Gruner rule.
23. See note 22 supra.
24. ]bid.
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ing any result premised on the earlier adjudications. Since the assignee in
the instant case had filed notice of the assignment with the state comptroller
prior to the service of the third party subpoena by the city on that official, the
instant decision leaves nothing that the assignee can do to protect his security once it is determined that the assignment is of a potential fund rather
than a fund in being.
Yet the distinction between the two appears to be difficult to draw.
Where the refund right arises from a rejection of the application for a
license this same court has held that the assignment of such a right is one
of a present fund and entitled to legal recognition,2 5 with the result that
the assignee takes priority over subsequent judgment creditors of the
assignor. In the case of rejection of the application the right to the refund
of the deposit submitted with the application is contingent on the happening of an event-rejection by the appropriate state authority. However,
refund on surrender also is contingent upon the happening of an eventthe surrender of the license by its holder 26 Despite this similarity the
court has chosen to treat an assignment of the former as one of a fund
in being and an assignment of the latter as one of a potential fund. The
divergent consequences of such a distinction would seem to require a
sounder basis for the distinction than that profferred by the instant court.

Criminal LawPOST-INDICTMENT ORDER SUPPRESSING EVIDENCE
MAY NOT BE APPEALED BY THE GOVERNMENT
EVEN THOUGH ORDER RESULTS IN DISMISSAL
OF THE INDICTMENT FOR LACK OF EVIDENCE;
BILL PROPOSED TO GIVE THE GOVERNMENT
THIS RIGHT
Defendants were indicted in the District Court for the District of
Columbia for violation of local lottery laws. Defendants' pre-trial motion
for the suppression of evidence seized from their persons at the time of
the arrest was granted. The Government appealed the order and the
court of appeals, assuming jurisdiction, reversed the district court on the
merits.' The Supreme Court, reversing the court of appeals, held that an
order suppressing evidence is not a "final decision" 2 and hence is not appealable by the Government, even when the effect of the order is to force
dismissal of the indictment for lack of evidence. Carroll v. United States,
354 U.S. 394 (1957).
25. See note 10 supra.
26. Instant case at 434-35, 141 N.E.2d at 577 (dissenting opinion).
1. 234 F.2d 679 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
2. The Court held that the order neither had sufficient independence to be a
"final decision" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1952), see text and notes
at notes 6-8 infra, nor sufficient finality to be a "final decision" within the unique
provisions of the District of Columbia Code, see text and notes at notes 9-10 infra.
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5
The right to appeal in federal criminal cases exists only by statute

In general, appeals by the Government in criminal cases are held to be
4
exceptional and are not favored by the courts. Primary statutory authority
for government appeals is to be found in the Criminal Appeals Act which
5
only a few specific instances; orders suppressing evidence
allows appeals irl
are not included. However, federal courts of appeal may also by statute
entertain appeals from all final determinations of matters collateral to and
6
sufficiently independent of the main body of the criminal action. Appeal7
able under this test are matters such as a bail order or an order granting
a motion to return property where the impounding of the property was
8
distinct from the criminal action. In the District of Columbia the Government may also appeal any "final decision" from which the defendant could
3. United States v. Sanges, 144 U.S. 310, 312, 318 (1892); OarlELD, CalmNAI
iN Am mcA 58 (1939).
4. Instant case at 400.
5. 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1952): "An appeal may be taken by and on behalf of the
United States from the district courts direct to the Supreme Court of the United States
in all criminal cases in the following instances: From a decision or judgment setting
aside, or dismissing any indictment or information, or any count thereof, where such decision or judgment is based upon the invalidity or construction of the statute upon which
the indictment or information is founded. From a decision arresting a judgment
of conviction for insufficiency of the indictment or information, where such decision
is based upon the invalidity or construction of the statute upon which the indictment
or information is founded. From a decision or judgment sustaining a motion in bar,
when the defendant has not been put in jeopardy. An appeal may be taken by and
on behalf of the United States from the district courts to a court of appeals in all
criminal cases, in the following instances: From a decision or judgment setting
aside, or dismissing any indictment or information, or any count thereof except
where a direct appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States is provided by
this section. From a decision arresting a judgment of conviction except where a
direct appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States is provided by this
section. The appeal in all such cases shall be taken within thirty days after the
decision or judgment has been rendered and shall be diligently prosecuted. PendAPPF- s

ing the prosecution and determination of the appeal in the foregoing instances,
the defendant shall be admitted to bail on his own recognizance. . ..
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1952): "The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction
of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts . . . except where a direct
review may be had in the Supreme Court." This provision applies to criminal
actions, and to either party to the controversy including the Government. For cases
see notes 7 and 8 infra. 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1952) grants a similar right of appeal
in certain interlocutory cases. See Swift & Co. v. Compania Caribe, 339 U.S. 684
(1950) (plaintiff allowed to appeal a district court order vacating attachment of a
vessel in admiralty proceedings); Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949)
(defendant corporation allowed to appeal district court order denying corporation's
motion to have plaintiff post security in a stockholder's derivative suit).
7. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951) (Court denied defendants' petition for
habeas corpus on the ground that the proper remedy from district 'court's denial
of their motion to reduce bail was to appeal to the court of appeals); United
States v. Weiss, 233 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1956) (defendant in Smith Act prosecution
appealed and was granted reduction of bail); United States v. Stein, 231 F.2d 109
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 943 (1956) (defendant in Smith Act prosecution
appealed and was granted reduction of bail).
8. United States v. Ponder, 238 F2d 825 (4th Cir. 1956) (Government allowed
to appeal order to return election records in election fraud case where the impounded
material was being used by the FBI investigation of the fraud rather than merely
being used for prosecution).
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have appealed. Whether this confers a broader right of appeal is unclear.
It has been held that the Government may appeal the quashing of an arrest
warrant under this provision of the District of Columbia Code.'
However, arguably this could be appealed as a collateral matter in other circuits.
Thus, an appeal by the Government in the District of Columbia from an
order suppressing evidence would be entertained only if it could be shown
that the order is either so collateral to the principle issue being litigated as
to have no effect on a final determination of the case or is a "final decision"
under the laws of the District of Columbia. In other circuits a motion to
suppress evidence made prior to any indictment has been considered sufficiently independent of the principal case to enable the Government and the
defendant to appeal.:" Appeals from similar motions occurring after indictment but before trial have been denied on the ground that the subject matter
of the motion is integrally related to the proceedings. 12 In the instant case
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia allowed the government
appeal, not on the ground that the matter appealed from was collateral,
but on the ground that the order constituted a "final decision" under the
laws of the District of Columbia since it resulted in dismissal of the
Government's case.'3
9. "In all criminal prosecutions the United States . . . shall have the same
right of appeal that is given to the defendant, including the right to a bill of
exceptions; Provided, That if on such appeal it shall be found that there was error
in the rulings of the court during a trial, a verdict in favor of the defendant shall

not be set aside." D.C. CoDE ANN. §23-105 (1951). "Nothing contained in any
Act of Congress shall be construed to empower the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia to allow an appeal from any interlocutory order entered
in any criminal action or proceeding or to entertain any such appeal heretofore
or hereafter allowed or taken." D.C. CODE ANN. § 17-102 (1951).
Although it would appear that the Government could appeal an acquittal under
the above statutes to have a question of law determined, in United States v. Evans,
213 U.S. 297 (1909), such an appeal was denied on the ground that it would only
settle a moot question. See also District of Columbia v. Kendall, 20 F.2d 287 (D.C.
Cir. 1927).
10. United States v. Basiliko, 35 A2d 185 (D.C. Mun. App. 1943).
11. United States v. Bianco, 189 F.2d 716 (3d Cir. 1951); United States v.
Poller, 43 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1930) (appeals by the Government); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931); Perlman v. United States, 247
U.S. 7 (1918); In re Sana Laboratories, Inc., 115 F.2d 717 (3d Cir. 1940), cert.
denied, 312 U.S. 688 (1941) (appeals by the defendant). In some cases in which
the motion was made after indictment, if the emphasis was on return of the property
seized rather than its suppression as evidence, the motion has been treated as collateral and appealable. E.g., Dowling v. Collins, 10 F.2d 62 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
270 U.S. 660 (1926). In states where illegal seizure of evidence is not grounds for its
inadmissibility, the courts have considered a motion to suppress and return evidence
a separate action. People v. Mayen, 188 Cal. 237, 205 Pac. 435 (1922); State v.
Myers, 36 Idaho 396, 211 Pac. 440 (1922); State v. Peterson, 27 Wyo. 185, 194
Pac. 342 (1920); 39 VA. L. REv. 103, 104 (1953).
12. United States v. Wallace & Tiernan Co., 336 U.S. 793 (1949); Cogen v.
United States, 278 U.S. 221 (1929); United States v. Williams, 227 F.2d 149 (4th
Cir. 1955); United States v. Rosenwasser, 145 F2d 1015 (9th Cir. 1944).
13. 234 F.2d 679 (D.C. Cir. 1956). The court based its decision on its earlier
decision in United States v. Cefaratti, 202 F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1952), cert. denied,
345 U.S. 907 (1953), in which an order suppressing evidence was held appealable
by the Government after dismissal of the indictment on account of the order.
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In holding that the Government was without a right of appeal, the
Supreme Court similarly adopted the view that the order was not collateral to the action, distinguishing this order from plenary orders such as
bail on the ground that an order relating to the evidence which may be
introduced is an integral part of the criminal proceeding. The Court also
held that an order suppressing evidence was not a "final decision" under
the laws of the District of Columbia, rejecting the Government's contention
and the court of appeals' position that finality should be interpreted broadly
so as to include orders causing the Government to nol pros its case. Rather,
the Court found that the standard of finality under the District of Columbia
Code provision is the same when taken in conjunction with the laws of
the District of Columbia as that which governs when an order is sought
to be appealed as collateral; an order to suppress would not satisfy this
standard because it does not of itself terminate the proceedings. Thus the
Court affirmed that in no circuit may the Government appeal a postindictment order suppressing evidence.
In narcotics, smuggling, gambling, lottery and similar cases frequently
14
the bulk of the Government's evidence is obtained by seizure at arrest.
Orders to suppress evidence often mean that the Government must either
dismiss the indictment or prosecute a weak case.' 5 Thus, government law
enforcement agencies and the public have a substantial interest in correct
substantive determinations by district courts of the questions presented
by a motion to suppress. The problem is aggravated by a lack of uniformity
Congress has recognized the hardship resultamong the district courts.'
ing from nonreviewability of orders to suppress evidence in narcotics cases
where motions for such orders are virtually a matter of course. 17 A statute
now grants the Government the right to appeal pre-trial orders to suppress
evidence in narcotics cases provided the appeal is taken within thirty days
8
and the Government certifies that the purpose of the appeal is not delay.'
14. Hearing Before Subcommittee No. 2 of the House Committee of the Judiciary

on H.R. 7404, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1954) describes the situation with respect
to narcotics cases.
15. S.REP. No. 2033, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 63 (1956). It has been suggested

that such a ruling is no harder on the Government than any adverse ruling on

evidence at trial, United States v. Rosenwasser, 145 F.2d 1015, 1018 (9th Cir. 1944),
but rulings at trial normally go to the merits of the Government's evidence and

hence to the merits of its case, whereas here the Government is not permitted an
opportunity to reach the merits.
16. S. REF. No. 2033, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1956). Earlier the need for
uniformity was sharply felt when there was no appeal from dismissal of an indictment.

This resulted in legislation allowing the Government to appeal in such

cases.

FRANxFURTER & LANDIS, THE BUSINEss OF THE SUPREmE COURT

Miller, Appeals by the State in Criminal Cases, 36

114 (1928);

YALE L.J. 486, 505 (1927).

17. S. REP. No. 1997, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1956).
18. "In addition to any other right to appeal, the United States shall have the
right to appeal from an order granting a motion for return of seized property and
to suppress evidence made before the trial of a person charged with a violation
of [designated narcotics offenses]. This section shall not apply with respect to any
such motion unless the United States attorney shall certify, to the judge granting
such motion, that the appeal is not taken for purposes of delay. Any appeal under
this section shall be taken within 30 days after the date the order was entered and
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Currently a bill is pending in Congress which would, through amendment
of the Criminal Appeals Act, extend this appeal right to any "decision sustaining a motion to suppress evidence," 1 thereby calling for a result contrary to that reached by the instant case. Moreover, the bill would not
limit the right of appeal to pre-trial orders but would permit appeal of
orders to suppress made at trial as well.20 Since the desirability of such
a measure is obvious from the standpoint of the Government and the
public's interest in law enforcement, only if it imposes unreasonable hardship upon defendants should the bill not be enacted into law.
Appeals prior to termination of the proceedings cause hardship to the
defendant through delay in determination of his status, additional expense,
and the possibility of prolonged incarceration in the event that the defendant has been unable to secure ball. The last objection is met by a
provision in the Criminal Appeals Act requiring that the defendant be
"admitted to bail on his own recognizance. . . ." pending prosecution and
determination of the appeal. 21 Likewise, the Criminal Appeals Act stipulates
that the Government's appeal must be taken within thirty days. 2 Although
this in part meets the objection of delay, consideration of a shorter time
limit for appeal of orders to suppress evidence may be in order.2 Additional expense to the accused appears the one unavoidable hardship if the
shall be diligently prosecuted." Narcotics Control Act of 1956, 18 U.S.C. § 1404
(Supp. III, 1956).
Originally Congress considered making the Government certify that the order
to suppress would force dismissal of the indictment. This was criticized because
often the Government would still have a small amount of evidence and hence could
not so certify although it stood a very small chance of getting a conviction.
Hearing Before Subcommittee of Senate Committee on the Judiciary on S. 3670,
84th Cong., 2d Sess. 43 (1956).
19. H.R. 263, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).
20. Allowing appeal at any stage of the proceedings may involve double jeopardy
if the appeal is taken after the start of the trial since jeopardy attaches when the
jury is sworn. Sanford v. Robbins, 115 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1940); Clawans v.
Rives, 104 F.2d 240 (D.C. Cir. 1939). However, the jeopardy privilege may be
waived, McGinley v. Hudspeth, 120 F.Id 523 (10th Cir. 1941); Caballero v.
Hudspeth, 114 F.Zd 545 (10th Cir. 1940), and it has been suggested that defendant's motion to suppress evidence during trial would constitute such a waiver.
Hearing Before Subcommittee No. 2 of the House Committee on the Judiciary on
H.R. 7404, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 9-11 (1954). In addition, this problem will not often
arise since usually the evidence will be gotten at the time of arrest, id. at 2, and
the defendant will be in a position to make his motion to suppress before trial. See
FE. R. CIum. P. 41(e); although cases have allowed the motion at trial if the
seizure was unconstitutional or if the defendant did not know of the evidence until
trial, Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 34 (1925); Gouled v. United States,
255 U.S. 298 (1921), the general rule is that the trial will not be interrupted to litigate the legality of the seizure.
21. See note 5 mipra.
22. Ibid.
23. Because the Government will presumably have prepared and argued its
position on the motion to suppress when before the district court, ten days might
well be a sufficient period within which the Government would have to take its
appeal. As the Court in the instant case observed, "the 30-day period was much
more of a speed-up when the Criminal Appeals Act was drawn in 1907 than it is today." Instant case at 408 n.23.
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Government is to have the right to appeal, unless Congress would see fit to
permit the assessment of costs against the Government in the event its
appeal fails 2 4 Nevertheless, the substantiality of this hardship does not
appear great enough to demand that the bill be rejected.

International LawTREATY OF EXTRADITION WITH ITALY HELD
SUSPENDED RATHER THAN ABROGATED BY WAR ON
THE BASIS OF EXECUTIVE NOTIFICATION UNDER
THE ITALIAN PEACE TREATY
Petitioner, a citizen of Italy, living in the United States since 1926,
was convicted in absentia in 1931 by an Italian court for a murder committed there in 1922. In 1954, pursuant to the Treaty of Extradition of
1868 with the United States,1 the Italian Government initiated extradition
2
proceedings which, after a hearing before a United States commissioner,
resulted in petitioner's arrest and detention. Petitioner applied for a writ
of habeas corpus and a declaratory judgment asserting that his detention
for extradition was illegal. He contended that World War I13 had abrogated the 1868 agreement and that the provision in the Italian Peace Treaty
24. Congress has done so before. See for example Coyle Lines, Inc. v. United
States, 198 F2d 195 (5th Cir. 1952), in which the court taxed the Government
the costs of appeal under 41 STAT. 526 (1920), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 743 (1952),
which provides that the Government may be liable for costs in certain admiralty
proceedings.
1. 15 STAT. 629 (1868), as amended, 16 STAT. 767 (1869), 24 STAT. 1001 (1885).
Under the treaty, the crime of murder is made an extraditable offense.
2. "Whenever there is a treaty or convention for extradition between the United
States and any foreign government, any justice or judge of the United States, or any
commissioner authorized so to do by a court of the United States, or any judge of a court
of record of general jurisdiction of any State, may, upon complaint made under oath,
charging any person found within his jurisdiction, with having committed within the
jurisdiction of any such foreign government any of the crimes provided for by such
treaty or convention, issue his warrant for the apprehension of the person so charged,
that he may be brought before such justice, judge, or commissioner, to the end that
the evidence of criminality may be heard and considered. If, on such hearing, he deems
the evidence sufficient to sustain the charge under the provisions of -theproper treaty or
convention, he shall certify the same, together with a copy of all the testimony taken
before him, to the Secretary of State, that a warrant may issue upon the requisition of
the proper authorities of such foreign government, for the surrender of such person,
according to the stipulations of the treaty or convention; and he shall issue his warrant
for the commitment of the person so charged to the proper jail, there to remain until
such surrender shall be made." 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1952). "The Secretary of State may
order the person committed under sections 3184 or 3185 of this title to be delivered to
any authorized agent of such foreign government, to be tried for the offense of which
charged." 18 U.S.C. § 3186 (1952).
3. On December 11, 1941, the Congress of the United States declared that a state
of war existed between the United States and Italy. 55 STAT. 797 (1941)., At the conclusion of the war, a treaty of peace was concluded, effective September 15, 1947. 61
STAT. 1245, T.I.A.S. No. 1648.
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of, 19474 authorizing the Executive branch of the Government to revive
any treaty with Italy in force at the time of the commencement of hostilities,
by mere notification, is a violation of the constitutional provision requiring
all treaties to be ratified by a vote of two-thirds of the Senate. 5 The district court, 6 and, on appeal, 7 the court of appeals, held that the extradition
treaty was merely suspended during the war, and that it is now in effect.8
Argento v. Horn, 241 F.2d 258 (6th Cir., 1957), cert. denied, 26 U.S.L.
WEEK 3110 (U.S. Oct. 15, 1957) (No. 183).
American courts generally concede that the effect of war on a treaty
is primarily a political question. 9 Any manifestation of opinion on the
question of the existence of a treaty by the political branches of the Govern-

ment is deemed to be controlling,' ° or at least of very great weight in de4. "a. Each Allied or Associated Power will notify Italy, within a period of six
months from the coming into force of the present Treaty, which of its pre-war bilateral
treaties with Italy it desires to keep in force or revive. Any provisions not in conformity with the present Treaty shall, however, be deleted from the above-mentioned
Treaties. . . . c. All such Treaties not so notified shall be regarded as abrogated."
Treaty of Peace with Italy, Feb. 10, 1947, art. 44, 61 STAT. 1245, 1386, T.I.A.S. No.
1648.
5. U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
6. This case was tried in the district court under the name of Argento v. North,
131 F. Supp. 538 (N.D. Ohio 1955). Since the decision in the instant case, plaintiff has
filed a motion to stay mandate pending his filing a motion for a petition for rehearing
in the United States Supreme Court. Letter from Martin A. Rini, Esq., attorney for
the defendant, to the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Nov. 5, 1957, on file in
the Biddle Law Library.
7. See instant case at n.2, where it is stated that this appeal was taken only in the
declaratory judgment action, no appeal having been taken from the court's denial of a
writ of habeas corpus. The court questions the propriety of an action for declaratory
judgment to test the legality of a completed extradition hearing, but assumes such
action is proper for purposes of deciding the instant case.
8. The instant court, in reaching this decision, therefore found it unnecessary to
treat the constitutional issue raised by the plaintiff.
9. Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947); Brownell v. San Francisco, 126 Cal. App.
2d 102, 271 P.2d 974 (1954) ; Meier v. Schmidt, 150 Neb. 383, 34 N.W.2d 400 (1948) ;
Techt v. Hughes, 229 N.Y. 222, 128 N.E. 185, cert. denied, 254 U.S. 643 (1920). Cf.
The Sophie Rickmers, 45 F.2d 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1930) (the court said that, though the
question is judicial in nature, great weight will be given to a construction of the treaty
by the Executive Department). Some writers have expressed the view that all treaties
should be abrogated by war. 3 PHILLIMot, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 530 (3d ed. 1885) ;
De La Pradelle, The Effect of War on Private Law Treaties, 2 INTL & Comr. L.Q.
555, 561 (1948) ; Annot., 11 A.L.R. 180 (1921). At the other extreme is the view that
war should abrogate no treaties whatsoever. Law of Treaties, 29 Am. J. INT'L LAW
657, 1183-89 (Supp. 1935) ; Politis, Effets de la. Guerre, 24 ANNUAIRZ Dn L'INSTITUT
Dn DROlT INTERNATIONAL 201, 207-08 (France 1911). American courts have adopted
the view of Justice Washington in Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts v. New Haven, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) *464, *494 (1823), expressly rejecting
the view that all treaties are extinguished, ipso facto, by war between the two contracting governments. For a discussion of the positions taken by foreign courts, see Rank,
Modern War and the Validity of Treaties, 38 CORNELL L.Q. 511-33 (1953); De La
Pradelle, supra; Law of Treaties, supra. An international tribunal of arbitration at
The Hague has taken the view that "International law in its modern development recognized that a great number of Treaty obligations are not annulled by war, but at most
suspended by it." North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Tribunal of Arbitration (The Hague,
1910); Scott, THE HAGUE COURT REPORTS 141, 159 (1916).
10. In the leading case of Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270 (1902), the Court said:
"And without considering whether extinguished treaties can be renewed by tacit consent under our Constitution, we think that on the question whether this treaty has
ever been terminated, governmental action in respect to it must be regarded as of con-
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ciding the question." Where there is no indication of political opinion on
the question of the effect of war on a treaty, the judiciary has applied the
standard expressed by Judge Cardozo in Techt v. Hughes: 2 The Courts
must ascertain whether the intrinsic character of the treaty provision in
question 13 is inconsistent with the policy or safety of the nation in the
emergency of war, and, hence, presumably intended to be limited to times
of peace. 14 Those treaties compatible with a state of hostilities will be enforced; those incompatible will either be abrogated entirely or merely suspended during the period of war, reviving in full force at the cessation of
hostilities.15 Treaties of alliance, those creating a sphere of influence, and
those which have been the cause of the conflict are terminated by the outbreak of war, 16 whereas boundary treaties and those regulating the conduct
of hostilities survive. 17 Agreements granting aliens the right to hold land
in this country survive armed conflict,' 8 as do treaties giving an alien the
right to take property under a will. 19 It has been held that treaties exempting the lands and buildings of either nation from taxation by the
trolling importance." Id. at 285. "It cannot be successfully contended that the
courts could properly intervene on the ground that the treaty under which both governments had proceeded, had terminated by reason of the adoption of the constitution
of the German Empire, notwithstanding the judgment of both governments to the
contrary." Id. at 289-90.
11. "A construction of a treaty by the political department of the Government,
while not conclusive upon a court called upon to construe such a treaty in a matter nvolving personal rights, is nevertheless of much weight." Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S.
447, 468 (1913). Sullivan v. Kidd, 254 U.S. 433 (1921); The Sophie Rickmers, 45
F.2d 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1930).
12. 229 N.Y. 222, 128 N.E. 185, cert. denied, 254 U.S. 643 (1920).
13. Though one provision of a treaty is annulled, it does not necessarily follow that
another provision of the same treaty will suffer a similar fate. Compare Society for
the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts v. New Haven, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat)
*464 (1823), in which the Court held that article IX of the Jay Treaty of 1784 between
the United States and England was not abrogated by the War of 1812, with Karnuth
v. United States ex rel. Albro, 279 U.S. 231 (1929), in which the Court ruled that
article III of the Jay Treaty was abrogated by the ensuing war; Techt v. Hughes,
supranote 12.
14. Techt v. Hughes, 229 N.Y. 222, 243, 128 N.E. 185, 192, cert. denied, 254 U.S.
643 (1920).
15. Ibid.
16. Karnuth v. United States ex reL. Albro, 279 U.S. 231, 236-37 (1929); Techt v.
Hughes, 229 N.Y. 222, 242, 128 N.E. 185, 191, cert. denied, 254 U.S. 643 (1920)
(dictum); HALL, INTERNATIoNAL LAW 456-59 (8th ed. 1924); HALLwCK, INTIRNATiONAL LAW 314-15 (4th ed. 1908); 1 K'NT, CoZIMNTAgs 394 (2d ed. 1878); 2
OPPZNHIM, INTERNATIoNAL LAW 130 (8th ed. 1955).

17. Karnuth v. United States ex rel. Albro, supra note 16, at 236-37 (dictum);
Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts v. New Haven, 21 U.S.
(8 Wheat.) *464, *494 (1823) (dictum); The Sophie Rickmers, 45 F2d 413, 419
(S.D.N.Y. 1930) (dictum); Techt v. Hughes, supra note 16, at 242, 128 N.E. at 191
(dictum); CRANDALL, TaTAms, Taxm MAKING AND ENrORCFMXNT 443 (2d ed. 1916) ;

1 KxNT, op. cit. supra note 16, at 393; LAW-,NCX, INTxNATiONAL LAW 342-43 (7th ed.
1923); STocxToN, Oumxis ov INTERNATIONAL LAW 264-68 (1914); 2 WSTLAXI,
INZRmNATiONAL LAW 32-33 (1913).

18. Techt v. Hughes, 229 N.Y. 222, 243, 128 N.E. 185, 192, cert. denied, 254
U.S. 643 (1920).
19. Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947) ; In, re Meyer's Estate, 107 Cal. App. 2d
799, 238 P.2d 597 (1951) ; Kansas ex rel. Miner v. Reardon, 120 Kan. 614, 245 Pac. 158
(1926); Goos v. Brock, 117 Neb. 750, 223 N.W. 13 (1929). Cf. Sullivan v. Kidd, 254
U.S. 433 (1921) ; see also Sutton v. Sutton, 1 Russ. & M. 664, 39 Eng. Rep. 255 (1830).
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other,20 and treaties granting alien shipping certain privileges with regard
to tonnage duties 21 are not abrogated by war. Karnuth v. United States
ex rel. Albro 22 is the only instance in which an American court held that a
state of war abrogated a treaty. There the Court ruled in 1929 that a provision of a 1794 treaty, granting to the subjects of Great Britain present
in Canada and the citizens of the United States, the right freely to pass
and repass into their respective territories, was incompatible with a state of
war between such nations and, therefore, abrogated by the War of 1812.28
The Court held that free access to the other's territory necessarily ceases
to operate during a war, and does not necessarily revive following the termination of the war, for distrust and hatred concomitant with the war may
24
Although it has been judicially 2
continue to pervade the ensuing peace.
26
and legislatively
determined that a person may not be extradited from
the United States in the absence of a valid treaty so providing, the specific
question of the effect of war on a treaty of extradition has never been before an American court,2 7 although textwriters have alluded to it. 2 5
Analytically, the constitutional question posed by petitioner-whether
the treaty notification procedure is an unconstitutional substitute for Senate
approval of a treaty 2Q--arises only if the treaty is one which would be
abrogated by war.30 By definition a treaty not abrogated by war is one
20. Brownell v. San Francisco, 126 Cal. App. 2d 102, 271 P.2d 974 (1954).
21. Flensburger Dampfercompagnie v. United States, 73 Ct. Cl. 646, 59 F.2d 464,
cert. denied, 286 U.S. 564 (1932); The Sophie Rickmers, 45 F.2d 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1930).
22. 279 U.S. 231 (1929).
23. Id. at 241.
24. Id. at 239.
25. Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5 (1936); Factor v.
Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276 (1933).
26. "The provisions of this chapter relating to the surrender of persons who have
committed crimes in foreign countries shall continue in 'force only during the existence
of any treaty of extradition with such foreign government." 18 U.S.C. § 3181 (1952).
This is in accord with the modern view among nations, though at one time international comity was recognized as sufficient basis for granting extradition. 4 Moopm,
INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST §§ 580-82 (1906).
27. Cf. Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447 (1913); Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 271
(1902) ; Ivancevic v. Artukovic, 211 F.2d 565, (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 818
(1954).
28. CRANDALL, TszAntrs, TanIR MAKING AND ENVORCEMPNT 447-48 (2d ed. 1916),
in which it is pointed out that, following the Spanish-American War, the United States
Government made a distinction between a convention with Spain providing for annual
payments on a debt, which obligation it considered perpetual, and commercial, consular
and extradition treaties which the two governments were renegotiating after the conclusion of the war. Query whether the two governments believed the extradition treaty
to have been abrogated as a result of the hostilities. See also 5 MooaR, op. cit. supra
note 26, § 779; 4 id. §§ 580-93; 4 HAcKwoRTH, DIGEST Op INTERNTrioNAL LAW 38,
204 (1942).
29. See text at note 5 mupra.
30. It is questionable whether the rationale of abrogation of treaties, such as treaties
of alliance, developed during a period of less high-pressured international relations,
continues to be valid today when the shift in the balance of power is so sudden and the
tension of international relations so great There is also a practical difficulty in getting
a judicial review of such treaties due to the inability of an individual to show injury
under such a treaty and, hence, adequate standing to sue. Rank, Modern War and the
Validity of Treaties, 38 CORNIL L.Q. 321, 324 (1953).
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which survives the war with full vitality, hence is one which would require
no new Senate consent. The problem arises from the present uncertainty
in international law as to which treaties are abrogated and which are not.3 '
The dogma adopted by courts to avoid resolution of this difficult question
is that the court will first look to the Executive branch of the Government
for guidance and will adopt the position taken by that branch if one has
been expressed.3 2 The notification procedures in the Italian and other peace
treaties 33 were apparently drafted with this doctrine in mind in an attempt
to find a practical way of achieving certainty in this unsettled area of international law. Thus, a procedure was established by which the Executive 34 would make an expression (either affirmatively or through silence)
as to the effect of war on each treaty with a former enemy.35 The effect of
the instant decision is to give judicial approval to the drafting device utilized, but without giving articulated consideration to the constitutional
problem which it poses.
In accepting the Secretary of State's notification to the Italian Government that the United States wished to keep the extradition treaty in force 36
as determinative that it was not abrogated, the court in the instant case
must have adopted, although without articulation, one of two premises.
It may have premised that extradition treaties are not per se abrogated by
war and that therefore it was free to look to the Executive branch of the
Government to determine whether this extradition treaty had been abrogated. This would be the approach presumably advocated by the textwriters.3 7 Or it may have premised that the court is bound to follow or
should follow the Executive in all cases where the Executive has manifested
its intent as to whether or not a treaty remains in force. Adoption of the
second position would have the virtue of certainty and expedition by ob31. Karnuth v. United States ex rel. Albro, 279 U.S. 231 (1929) ; Techt v. Hughes,
229 N.Y. 222, 128 N.E. 185, cert. denied, 254 U.S. 643 (1920); Orfield, The Effect of
War on Treaties, 11 Ni. L. BULL. 276 (1933).
32. See text and notes at notes 9-11 mtpra.
33. Treaty of Peace with Roumania, Feb. 10, 1947, art. 10, 61 STAT. 1757, 1803,
T.I.A.S. No. 1649; Treaty of Peace with Hungary, Feb. 10, 1947, art. 10, 61 SAT.
2065, 2115, T.I.A.S. No. 1651; Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria, Feb. 10, 1947, art. 8, 61
STAT. 1915, 1956, T.I.A.S. No. 1650.
34. The terms of the treaty do not require that it be the Executive branch of the
United States Government which alone shall decide whether or not to give notification.
Instead the treaty merely states that "Each . . . Power" shall notify. See note 4
supra. However, it is apparently accepted that the State Department shall be solely
responsible for notification and need not consult the Senate formally.
35. The terms of the treaty provision make inevitable a manifestation by the Executive branch of the Government. Where no notification has been given, it may be said
that silence is a manifestation of governmental policy. But see Karnuth v. United
States, ex re. Albro, 279 U.S. 231, 242 (1929), since the treaty provision itself stipulates a time limit of six months within which notification, if any, has to be given.
All treaties not so notified witilm six months are deemed'to be abrogated. See
note 4 stpra.
36. On February 6, 1948, the Secretary of State notified Italy that the United
States desired to keep in force and revive, among others, the Treaty of Extradition of
1868. Brief for Appellant, p. 2, instant case.
37. See notes 16 and 17 supra.
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viating the need for judicial consideration of the effect, of war upon a
treaty. Moreover, it might be thought to preclude the constitutional issue
in that the conclusion reached through notification is that the treaty was
not abrogated,3 8 hence requires no new Senate consent. In reality, however, this position assumes the constitutional question raised by petitioner.
This may be illustrated by consideration of a mutual defense treaty, one of
that class of treaties the nature of which is so incompatible with war, that
the treaty must be abrogated by a state of hostilities between the signatory
nations. 39 If notification is held determinative, the Secretary of State is
given power to reinstate a treaty which conceptually has ceased to have
existence. Thus, by his action he would actually create a new treaty. This
in turn would contravene the constitutional requirement of participation by
40
the Senate in the treaty-making process.
The other position which the court may have adopted-that an extradition treaty is not per se abrogated by war, hence the court was free to
look to Executive expressions for guidance in determining whether the
treaty was in fact abrogated-similarly poses difficulties. The most obvious
of these is application of a standard to distinguish between treaties which are
per se abrogated and those which are not.41 Moreover, opening the way to
at least limited judicial consideration of the effect of war on treaties runs
counter to the purpose of achieving certainty expressed in the peace treaty
notification procedures. However, in leaving the court free to determine
independently the effect of war on a treaty, the constitutional problem is
not raised in that the Executive is not put in the position of being able to
establish, through notification, that a treaty the continuance of which may
have been completely inconsistent with a state of war was nevertheless not
42
abrogated and hence beyond the power of the Senate to reconsider.
38. In addition to the manifestation by notification, the Solicitor General of the
United States filed a memorandum in opposition to petitioner's petition for a writ of
certiorari before the Supreme Court, in which that official expressed the view of the
Department of State that a valid extradition treaty did presently exist between the
United States and Italy. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, p. 9, instant case.
39. See note 16 supra.
40. See note 5 supra. It could be argued that the Senate, by ratifying the Italian
Peace Treaty, has given prior ratification to whatever treaties may be revived by notification. This raises a problem of delegation of powers which is beyond the scope of this
comment to discuss. In any event, the argument does not constitute an answer to the
constitutional problem posed but merely restates it.
41. The court could apply the standard laid down in Techt v. Hughes, see text and
notes at notes 12-15 supra, a vague directive to look to the intrinsic nature of the treaty
in question. Still confronting the court would be the difficulty in ascertaining a-treaty's
"intrinsic nature."
42. The Executive might give notification that it wished to revive a treaty ordinarily thought abrogated by war, e.g., a treaty of mutual defense. However, it remains
incumbent upon a court adopting this premise to review such Executive declaration,
when called upon to do so, and, finding that the treaty sought to be revived is one abrogated by war, to declare invalid the Executive notification and require the exercise of
the ordinary treaty-making procedures. This approach, of course, does not consider the
possibility that the Senate may have constitutionally delegated its powers in treatymaking to the Executive through its ratification of the peace treaty clause permitting
the notification procedure. See note 40 mspra.
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In that this latter position avoids the constitutional question implicit
in the position recognizing that the court is bound in all cases by Executive manifestations it is to be favored. Its adoption would require the court
to determine whether a treaty of extradition by its intrinsic nature is one
of those treaties which war serves to abrogate. This the instant court expressly refused to do, although it alluded to the problem in dictum.4 Without discussing the constitutional ramifications of the alternatives confronting it, the court felt itself bound to follow the dictates of the Executive
branch of the Government.

Unfair CompetitionDISTRIBUTION OF TELEPHONE BOOK COVERS
CONTAINING ADVERTISING HELD NOT TO BE
UNFAIR COMPETITION IN SUIT
BY TELEPHONE COMPANY
Plaintiff telephone company brought suit in equity to enjoin defendant
corporation from distributing opaque plastic covers for telephone directories.
The covers advertised local businesses and were distributed free of charge.,
The directories furnished by the company also contain classified advertising 2 except in Boston where the "yellow pages" constitute a separate
volume. 3 Contending that the covers obscured and diluted the promotional
and advertising material in the classified advertising section, plaintiff
company sought relief on the theory that the distribution of the covers
constituted unfair competition through the unlawful appropriation of the
directories for the defendant's own business purposes. 4 The Supreme
43. "If the question [the effect of war on a treaty of extradition] were to be decided in a vacuum, the conclusion could only be that it is extremely doubtful that war
ipso facto abrogates a treaty of extradition. Fortunately, however, the question need not
be so decided, but can and must be decided against the background of the actual conduct of the two nations involved, acting through the political branches of their governments." Instant case at 262.
1. The covers were accompanied by a slip which read, "This sturdy attractive
cover . . . is presented to you with the compliments of the following companies."
Then follows a list of the business concerns on the cover. Instant case at 704.
2. The back cover of the directory had also been used by the telephone company
as space for paid advertising, but this practice has been discontinued. Ibid.
3. In 1955, from its classified advertising, the telephone company received net
income of $5,583,388.88, which is considered by the department of public utilities in
fixing rates. Id. at 703. See MASS. ANN. LAws c. 159, §§ 14, 20 (1948).
4. Plaintiff also contended that defendant's activity constituted a trespass on its
property, basing its contention upon tariffs, filed with the department of public utilities
in accordance with MAss. ANN. LAws c. 159, § 19 (1948), which stipulate that
"equipment, instruments and lines furnished by the . . . Company . . . are the
property of the . . . Company," and "Customers shall not use or permit to be used,
in connection with the equipment or facilities furnished by the . . . Company, any
electrical or mechanical apparatus or device, other than that furnished by the . . .
Company, nor permit the attachment of any advertising devices." Instant case at 707.
The court concluded that the tariff provisions did not apply to the directories and
that they were the property of the subscribers. Contra, Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v.
Miner, 11 Ill. App. 2d 44, 136 N.E.2d 1 (1956); National Tel. Directory Co. v.
Dawson Mfg. Co., 214 Mo. App. 683, 263 S.W. 483 (1924).
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Judicial Court of Massachusetts denied relief, affirming the decree of the
lower court. New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. National Merchandising

Corp., 141 N.E.2d 702 (Mass. 1957).
Except for a few scattered decisions, 5 the early United States cases
followed the English view of unfair competition, which limits the doctrine
to situations in which there has been a "passing off," i.e., cases in which
one party by imitation of name or device deceives the public into believing
it is purchasing the product of another.e In International News Serv. v.
Associated Press,7 decided in 1918, the Supreme Court extended the scope
of the doctrine by holding that it was unfair competition for a western
news service to gather information from bulletin boards and early editions
of an eastern news service for subsequent transmission to papers on the
west coast. Rejecting the contention that the doctrine is limited to cases
involving a "passing off," the Court asserted that the principle underlying
relief for unfair competition "is much the same as that which lies at the
base of the equitable theory of consideration in the law of trusts-that he
who has fairly paid the price should have the beneficial use of the property." 8 It recognized that the conduct of the defendant was closely related
to "passing off" in that "instead of selling its goods as those of complainant, it substitutes misappropriation in place of misrepresentation,
and sells complainant's goods as its own." 9 But the Court indicated that
these elements, referred to as "upside down passing off," 10 merely accentuated the more fundamental wrong, unjust enrichment at the plaintiff's
expense." Other courts have utilized the theory of unjust enrichment as
grounds for relief where there has been an unauthorized use of a competitor's effort, labor, skill or investment. In Meyer v. HurwitZ12 it was
held unfair competition to distribute post cards to be dispensed via vending
machines sold at cost to retailers by the plaintiff-competitor for the distribution of his own cards, despite the absence of a "passing off," the
lack of any contract between the plaintiff and the retailers to use the
plaintiff's cards exclusively, and the fact that a consummated sale of the
machines to the retailers had been effected. In Press Publishing Co. v.
Levi Bros. & Co.'3 it was considered unfair competition for defendant to
5. See, e.g., Witkop & Holmes Co. v. Great Atlantic & Pac. Tea Co., 69 Misc.
90, 124 N.Y. Supp. 956 (Sup. Ct. 1910).
6. 2 CALUmAN, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARxs § 601 (2d ed. 1950).
7. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
8. Id. at 240.
9. Id. at 242.
10. 1 CALLMAN, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS § 41.1 (2d ed. 1950).
11. International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 242 (1918).
12. 5 F.2d 370 (E.D. Pa. 1925).
13. 3 TRADE-MAR REP. 59 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1912). While the court in this case
spoke in terms of deceit upon the public, the case has been interpreted as resting on
the broader foundation of misappropriation of a competitor's advertising media. See
2 CALLmAN, op. cit. supra note 10, § 61.3(e). The court in the instant case cites the
Levi case as a decision of unfair competition, "despite absence of 'passing off.' "
Instant case at 709. See also Madison Square Garden Corp. v. Universal Pictures
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induce newspaper dealers to place sheets advertising his business inside
plaintiff's newspapers, although a sale of the newspapers to the dealers
had been effected and notwithstanding the statement on the inserted sheets
that they were not a part of any newspaper.
However, many jurisdictions, including Massachusetts, have rejected
the rationale of the International case and have continued to use the
"passing off" standard as the sole basis for relief in actions for unfair
competition.1 4 In F. W. Dodge Co. v. ConstructionInformation Co.15 the
Massachusetts court, basing its position upon principles akin to property
rights in intellectual compositions, enjoined defendant's reproduction and
sale of confidential business information it had obtained from one of plaintiff's subscribers who had obligated himself to hold the information in strict
confidence and utilize it only for personal business; and in Garst v.
Charles'0 the court, utilizing the doctrine of fraudulent conspiracy, enjoined
the activity of the defendant who by agreement with one of plaintiff's retailers accepted plaintiff's goods and sold them at a price lower than that
set by contract between plaintiff and its retailers. But the courts made no
reference to unfair competition in these opinions and later cases have not
extended the concepts underlying them into the law of unfair competition
in Massachusetts.' 7 To the contrary, Massachusetts courts have been
reluctant to expand the principles of unfair competition beyond its traditional common-law meaning, declaring that "when relief is sought against
a defendant on the basis of unfair competition, it is generally held to be
Co., 255 App. Div. 459, 7 N.Y.S.2d 845 (1st Dep't 1938); National Tel. Directory
Co. v. Dawson Mfg. Co., 214 Mo. App. 683, 263 S.W. 483 (1924) ; 2 CALUMAN, op. ct.
supra note 10, §§ 60-62.3; Note, 46 IHAv. L. REv. 1171 (1933).
14. See 1 Nims, U4FAMr COMPMTION An TRADE-MARxs § 9a (1947). This

attitude has been attributed to the vigorous and persuasive dissent in the International
case of Justice Brandeis, who felt that although the action of the defendant was unjust,
it was not subject to injunctive relief according to the then-established bounds of
unfair competition, and that consideration of the practical difficulties any judicial
extension of the law of unfair competition would necessarily create should have led
the court "to decline to establish a new rule of law in the effort to redress a newlydisclosed wrong, although the propriety of some remedy appears to be clear." International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 267 (1918).
15. 183 Mass. 62, 66 N.E. 20.4 (1903).
16. 187 Mass. 144, 72 N.E. 839 (1905).
17. California Wine & Liquor Corp. v. William Zakon & Sons, Inc., 297 Mass.
373, 378, 8 N.E.2d 812, 814 (1937). Whether or not, as has been suggested in
Esquire, Inc. br. Esquire Slipper Mfg. Co., 139 F. Supp. 228, 232 n.11 (D. Mass.
1956), the Massachusetts legislature, in enacting a statute providing that "Likelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of the distinctive quality of a
trade name or trade-mark shall be a ground for injunctive relief in cases of trademark infringement or unfair competition notwithstanding the absence of competition
between the parties or of confusion as to the source of goods or services," MAss.
ANN. LAws c. 110, § 7A (1954), intended to bring the Massachusetts law of unfair
competition into line with some of the more recent pronouncements of the limits of
unfair competition is doubtful so far as that state's courts are concerned, for while
the federal courts have not hesitated to apply this statutory provision when possessed of jurisdiction, see, e.g., Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Food Fair, Inc., 177 F.2d
177 (lst Cir. 1949), the opinions of the Massachusetts courts carefully avoid interpreting the scope of that legislation while retaining their established doctrines.
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essential for the plaintiff to prove that the defendant is passing off his
product as that of the plaintiff." 18
Other cases have arisen involving facts similar to those in the instant
case,' 9 but, except for one, 20 only in jurisdictions which have adopted the
International rationale. In these jurisdictions distribution of telephone
directory covers has been enjoined, on the theory that defendants' actions
constituted unfair competition. In Michigan Bell Tel. Co. v. Wharram,21
which is typical of these cases, the court, with no consideration of injury
to the telephone company by defendant's activities, stated, in opposition
to defendant's contention that unfair competition is found only where there
is a probability of deception and confusion, that "the sale or distribution of
something to be used in connection with plaintiff's property or articles
comes within the classification." 22 The instant case is the first reported
determination that the practice does not constitute unfair competition.
Because defendant's cover in the instant case clearly set forth its origin,

its distribution did not constitute "passing off" within the accepted meaning
of that concept, and accordingly the court's decision is not surprising in
view of Massachusetts' insistence on "passing off" as a sine qua non

of unfair competition.
The "unjust enrichment" rationale of International would appear to
be a sound formula when limited to factual situations where defendant's
gain is accompanied by a corresponding economic loss to the plaintiff.

The injustice of the enrichment in that case is fairly obvious, for it would
be unrealistic to suppose that any papers to whom the defendant there

was furnishing news would be willing to purchase the same items from
the plaintiff; thus each sale by the defendant to that extent reduced

plaintiff's potential market.

Previous telephone book cases, however, have

carried that rationale beyond the factual context of the International case
and afforded relief without demonstration of injury to the plaintiff.
18. California Wine & Liquor Corp. v. William Zakon & Sons, Inc., mupra note 17,
at 814.
19. Michigan Bell Tel. Co. v. Wharram, 82 P.U.R. (ns.) 94 (Cir. Ct. Mich.
1949) ; National Tel. Directory Co. v. Dawson Mfg. Co., 214 Mo. App. 683, 263
S.W. 483 (1924); Bell Tel. Co. v. Rogers, C.P., Allegheny Co., Pa., May 2,
1936; Lee Tel. Co. v. H. Carroll Walker, Corp. Ct., Danville, Va., Feb. 27,
1954. See also Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Miner, 11 Ill. App. 2d 44, 136 N.E2d 1

(1956).

20. The Illinois court, which limits unfair competition to "passing off," based its
decision in Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Miner, mpra note 19, on trespass. The instant
case rejected this theory by deciding that the telephone company did not have sufficient
interests in the telephone books to maintain an action of trespass.
21. 82 P.U.R. (n.s.) 94 (Cir. Ct. Mich. 1949).
22. Id. at 95. While the court in the Wharram case decided, contrary to the
court in the instant case, that the telephone books were the property of the plaintiff,
this in itself is not sufficient to distinguish it from the instant case on the theory
of unfair competition. Indeed, it has been stated unequivocally that a discussion
of property rights is irrelevant in a case of unfair competition. See 2 CALLMAN,
op. cit. supra note 10, § 61.1, discussing the opinion of the court in F. W. Dodge Co.
v. Construction Information Co., 183 Mass. 62, 66 N.E. 204 (1903).
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Granting relief in all situations involving "the sale or distribution of
something to be used in connection with the plaintiff's property or articles"
ignores a line of cases distinguishing between situations in which the
defendant makes accessories or parts usable with another's article and
those where the defendant uses a competitor's business system to sell his
own goods.2 3 Illustrative of the former is Myles Standish Mfg. Co. v.
Champion Spark Plug Co.,'2 which held that the manufacture and distribution of spark plug cores made to fit the shells of a competitor's plugs does
not constitute unfair competition. Typical of the latter, on the other hand,
is Meyer v. Hurwitz,25 in which the court declared that defendant cannot
be "restrained from competing with the plaintiff in the business of selling
coin-operated machines and cards for the purpose of carrying on the same,
business which is now being carried on by the plaintiff. But after the
plaintiff has, through years of effort and expenditure, built up a system
and organized a business, the defendant may not, by associating therewith
a right which is not denied him, that of imitating the plaintiff's uncopyrighted [post] cards, appropriate to himself the plaintiff's system and
organization for the purpose of underselling him and appropriating to himself profits to which the plaintiff through his efforts, expenditures, and
industry is entitled." 2 6 In cases like Meyer v. Hurwitz and Press Publishing Co. v. Levi Bros. & Co.27 the defendant employs the business system
of another to sell his own goods by using the plaintiff's product as a medium
to support that which is its very purpose, simultaneously devaluing that
product. This is the precise element of unfair competition which is absent
in the accessory and part cases-a car, for example, is rendered no less
valuable to its manufacturer by the addition to it of an accessory manufactured by another.
It is conceivable in the telephone book cases that customers of the
telephone company might cancel their advertising within the "yellow pages"
in favor of defendant's cover-advertisement scheme, especially businesses
which cater almost exclusively to a neighborhood market. Were there
some demonstration of actual and substantial harm resulting to the plaintiff
from defendant's conduct these cases would appear alignable with International, where the defendant's activity produced a corresponding recognizable loss to the plaintiff. But the court in the instant case found that
"apart from one instance where a subscriber decided to cancel his 'yellow
page' advertising, there is no evidence of . . . damage . . . to the
28
telephone company 'upon which any definite finding can be made."'
Advertisers apparently continue to deal with the telephone company whether
23. Cf. 2 CmLmAN, op. cit. supra note 10, § 61.3(d).
24. 282 Fed. 961 (8th Cir. 1922). See also Flagg Mfg. Co. v. Holway, 178 Mass.
83, 59 N.E. 667 (1901).
25. 5 F.2d 370 (E.D. Pa. 1925). See text at note 12 supra.
26. 5 F.2d at 371.
27. 3 TRnE-MAXK REP. 59 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1912). See text at note 13 supra.

28. Instant case at 705.
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or not they obtain cover space from the defendant. On this ground the
case may be distinguished from Meyer, where each sale of the defendant's
cards necessarily meant one less sale by the plaintiff, and from Inter29
national.
The instant court also took the public interest into consideration
in meeting plaintiff's contention that a reduction in its advertising revenue
due to the defendant's activity could cause a general rate increase for telephone service 30 in accordance with state regulations,8 1 but determined
that any possibility of this occurring was more than outweighed by the
public's interest in competition. It was concluded that to enjoin defendant's
business would be conducive to monopolistic extension in the area of
advertising where, even with regard to public utilities, competition is
32
". . privately beneficial without being publicly detrimental."
The court's consideration of harm to the plaintiff and the public's
interest is preferrable to an uncritical extension of the "unjust enrichment"
language of Internationai beyond its factual context. In view of the fact
that other doctrines are available to remedy the conduct which prevailed
in that case,33 the tendency of previous telephone cases to extend its
rationale and stress the defendant's "unwarranted" gain without adequately
treating the substantiality of harm to the plaintiff and the possible interests
of the public in the continuation of the activity appears difficult to justifywhether or not the entrepreneur is getting something for nothing should
have little bearing on whether his enterprise should be enjoined.
29. Press Publishing Co. v. Levi Bros. & Co., 3 TRADE-MA REP. 59 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1912), lends itself to the same analysis, for the defendant there would not be
willing to procure advertising space within the newspaper in addition to the advertising scheme it devised.
30. Instant case at 708.
31. MAss. ANN. LAWS c. 159, §§ 14, 20 (1948).
32. Instant case at 708.
33. See text at notes 15-16 supra.

